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Abstract 
This paper attempts to unearth quality of corporate governance practices of Indian Banking 
sector and highlight whether the corporate governance practices of listed public and private 
sector banks are symmetric post subprime crisis. The study examines that whether the key 
corporate governance factors like capital adequacy ratio, board size, number of independent 
directors and CEO duality affects the performance of banks. In addition to this, the paper goes on 
to find the essence of shareholding by non-executive directors and the regularity of directors in 
attending the board meetings. Further, for the perusal of corporate governance practices followed 
in the Indian banking sector a corporate governance index has been compiled from the data of all 
listed Indian banks. Moreover, the paper endeavors to exhume any relationship between the 
educational qualification of directors and its contribution on the banks’ performance, if any. The 
results provides an insight of the corporate governance structure of Indian banking sector and 
exhibit that the public and private sector banks have asymmetric corporate governance practices 
post subprime crisis. The empirical results of multiple regression analysis demonstrate a positive 
impact of corporate governance factors on Indian bank’s performance. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance is a way of life that moulds and directs the roles, responsibilities and 
rights of management and board of directors of organisations with a view to achieving the 
corporate objectives of the organisation and capturing the interests of various stakeholders. 
Corporate governance practices are relatively a new issue in Indian society and came into 
prominence in the 90’s due to securities scam in 1992 and disappearance of number of 
companies after rising capital in stock market in mid-90. In light of the Asian financial crisis, 
high profile scandals in Russia and Latin America, and the increased focus placed on governance 
practices in the Middle East and North Africa, corporate governance has been brought to the 
forefront and has become a strategic issue for businesses in the increasingly globalized economy. 
Good corporate governance is required because of the existence of agency problems caused by 
the separation of ownership of resources and managing those resources Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and minimize the conflict of interest between agents and principals. Sharma (2010a; 
2010b) opines that corporate governance is the way organizations are managed and controlled 
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and aims to achieve corporate excellence. Promoting the good corporate governance in banking 
sector is crucial to its economic performance. Therefore the extent to which this performance is 
achieved vis-a-vis corporate governance in the banking sector demands an in-depth exploration 
investigation and perhaps it is also the focus of this study. The debate of corporate governance 
goes decades back but the advancements in the recent past have changed the paradigm of this 
debate. The studies of Qu, Jiang, and Zhang (2012) investigated empirically the performance of 
banks in the BRIC countries (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, and China) during the financial 
crisis. The period under study was from 2003 to 2010, and it was found that, from 2007 to 2008, 
there was a significant decline in the banking efficiency due to the crisis. Similarly, Garcia-
Meca, Garcia-Sanchez, and Martnez-Ferrero (2015) have attempted to analyze the effect of 
board diversity (gender and nationality) on performance in banks and found its positive impact 
on banks’ performance. Dalwai, Rohaida, and Siti (2015) evaluates existing studies on the 
relationship of corporate governance with firm performance in different regions and address the 
need for similar analysis for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sector as well.  
 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
There is no single universe theory of corporate governance. Development of corporate 
governance is a global occurrence, and a complex area including legal, cultural, ownership, and 
structural differences. Thus, some theories might be more appropriate and relevant to some 
countries than others or, more relevant at different times depending on what stage an individual 
country, or group of countries, is at. The theories which define the corporate governance in 
different ways are agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency 
theory, social contract theory and legitimacy theory. The essence of the agency problem is the 
separation of management and finance, or as defined in more standard terminology, the 
separation of ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Stewardship theory suggests the 
unification of these two roles in one person who, as the steward of the organization, would act in 
the organization’s best interest. It has been empirically established that the returns, for an 
organization, improved by having both the positions (the CEO and the Chairman) combined 
rather than separated (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). According to the stakeholder theory the 
corporation must be run in the interest of stakeholders. According to the resource dependency 
rule, the directors bring resources such as information, skills, key constituents (suppliers, buyers, 
public policy decision makers, social groups) and legitimacy that will reduce uncertainty. Social 
contract theory as well as legitimacy theory are based upon the notion that there is a social 
contract between the society and an organisation. 
 
Formulation of Hypothesis 
Adams and Mehran (2003) stated that the practices of corporate governance in the banking sector 
differ from other sectors because of their characteristics as a regulated industry. Gillan, Hartzell, 
and Starks (2003) in their work hypothesized that corporate governance structures differ 
systematically across industries and firms due to differences in the costs and benefits of the 
monitoring mechanisms. Li and Harrison (2008) found that national culture has a dominant 
influence on corporate governance structure. Nippani, Vinjamury, and Bathala (2008) 
established that there exist significant differences between the governance structures of banks 
based on their size and that banks’ stock market returns are significantly influenced by board 
composition. Cheung, Stouraitis, and Tan (2010) found that the quality of corporate governance 
is very significant in explaining future company stock returns and risk. Kanojia (2010) 
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endeavored to emphasize that if the board of directors contribute to the company at regular 
interval, it improves the performance of banks. Utama and Musa (2011) shows that corporate 
governance practice, bank size and capital adequacy ratio have positive influence on bank 
performance in Indonesia. Wang, Lu, and Lin (2012) proved that corporate governance is 
important for the operating performance of BHCs. Panchasara and Bharadia (2013) showed that 
the corporate governance (CG) disclosure practices are positively associated with financial 
performance of Indian Banks by using the financial and non-financial parameters explained in 
the ‘Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure’ issue by the ISAR 
(International Standards of Accounting and Reporting). Sarpal (2014) found the significance of 
firm size by revealing that the relationships between some of the selected voluntary board 
practices do vary according to the firm size status. Madhani (2015) has found that board 
committees are major contributor to overall corporate governance and disclosure practices of 
Indian ﬁrms which help to understand that apart from statutory requirement of audit committee 
there is also a need for remuneration as well as nomination committees to improve the overall 
standard of corporate governance. After reviewing the literature we found that the banks with 
poor corporate governance practice performed worse and led to the crisis (Chambers, 2009; Ross 
& Crossan, 2012). According to Indian Banking Regulation Act 1949 not less than 51% of the 
total number of the board of directors comprising members with demonstrable professional and 
other experience in specific sectors like accountancy, agriculture and rural economy, banking, 
co-operation, economics, finance, law, small-scale industry, any other matter the special 
knowledge of, and practical experience in, which would, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank of 
India, be useful to the banking company. De Jonghe, Disli, and Schoors (2012) found that CEO 
non-duality, education level of executives, and a business education of the CEO and/or the 
chairman all relate to much better risk/return efficiency in the post-crisis period for banks. Their 
findings suggest that strict regulation in combination with improved board structure and 
composition might go a long way to improve the risk/return profile of banks. Largely it has been 
found that there exists a strong relation between governance structure, agency problem and 
firm’s performance level. Most of studies indicate better governed companies are more profitable 
and have higher firm value especially in countries with weak legal environments. Prior studies of 
Mace (1971); Pfeffer (1972); Lipton and Lorch (1992); and Jensen (1993) highlighted 
contrasting results of board size and effective monitoring. It has been empirically tested that 
large boards are generally less effective as compared to smaller boards due to communication 
and coordination advantages. (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorch, 1992). In view of important 
findings discussed above the present paper aims to gauge the performance of all listed Indian 
banks post subprime crisis and its dependency, if any on corporate governance practices. Further, 
it attempts to examine that whether the key corporate governance factors highlighted in the 
banking literature like capital adequacy, board size, number of independent directors and duality 
affects the performance of banks. In addition to it the paper attempts to find essence of 
shareholding by non-executive directors and regularity of directors in attending board meetings. 
The objective of this paper is to find that whether corporate governance affects the banks’ 
performance during the post crisis period and providing in-depth knowledge about the corporate 
governance practices along with the impact of education qualification of NEDs on the 
performance of Indian banking sector.  The study proposes the following alternate hypothesis: 
• Hα1: The capital adequacy ratio has a significant effect on the bank performance. 
• Hα2: Board size has significant impact on bank performance. 
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• Hα3: Attendance rate of directors at board meeting has a significant influence on bank 
performance. 
• Hα4: Bank performance is significantly affected by number of independent directors on 
board. 
• Hα5: Number of shares held by NEDs has a significant effect on the bank performance. 
• Hα6: Bank performance is significantly affected by CEO duality.  
• Hα7: Education Qualification of NEDs has a significant influence on bank performance. 
 
Data and Methodology 
This paper is based on the perusal of secondary data obtained from all the listed public as well as 
private sector banks in India. The relevant information about the key factors of corporate 
governance has been obtained through content analysis of the annual reports published by the 
banks. India has forty listed banks during the sample period of four years post subprime crisis 
2008-09 to 2011-12. The data collected from content analysis of one hundred and sixty annual 
reports has been categorized to facilitate descriptive analysis and to apply multiple regression 
analysis thereon. The key corporate governance factors which exhibit significant correlation have 
further been regressed with the independent variables of board size, number of independent 
directors, shareholding by non-executive directors, duality, capital to risk asset, educational 
qualification of the board and ROA, ROE, ROI as proxy to bank performance. ROA (Return on 
Assets) equals after tax net income (profits) divided by average total assets of bank (Lin & 
Zhang, 2009; Saunders & Cornett, 2005) and reflects the deployment of bank assets to yield its 
income (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). The central bank has set ROA as 
proxy for profitability while giving reference to the Indian banking conditions. Further, total 
assets as a denominator is very sensitive to the accounting methods used by the banks. The study 
also uses ROE (Return on Equity) as a proxy of bank performance relevant to shareholder’s 
investment (Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, & Udell, 2005; Kim & Rasiah, 2010). ROI (Return on 
Investment) is one of the determinants of key performance indicators of private sector banks. In 
order to evaluate the cause and effect of independent variables on the performance proxies the 
following regression equations have been formulated.  
 
ROE = α + β1 BOARD_SIZE + β2 ATTENDANCE + β3 SHARES + β4 ID + β5 CRAR + β6 CEO_DUALITY + ε      (1) 
 
ROA = α + β1 BOARD_SIZE + β2 ATTENDANCE + β3 SHARES + β4 ID + β5 CRAR + β6 CEO_DUALITY + ε      (2) 
 
ROI = α + β1 BOARD_SIZE + β2 ATTENDANCE + β3 SHARES + β4 ID + β5 CRAR + β6 CEO_DUALITY + ε       (3) 
 
ROE = α + β1 GR + β2 PG + β3 DOCT + β4 PROF + ε                  (4) 
 
ROA = α + β1 GR + β2 PG + β3 DOCT + β4 PROF + ε                  (5) 
 
ROI = α + β1 GR + β2 PG + β3 DOCT + β4 PROF + ε                  (6) 
 
Where: 
• α and β: constant and coefficient of applied model respectively. 
• ε: all the factors which affect the dependent variable but not included in the model.  
• BOARD_SIZE: total number of directors in the bank 
• ATTENDANCE: average attendance rate of the directors in the board meetings 
• SHARES: percentage of shares held by NEDs 
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• ID: percentage of Independent directors in the board 
• CRAR: Capital to Risk Assets Ratio   
• CEO_DUALITY: dummy variable, its value is 1 when there is no duality and 0 in case of 
duality. 
• GR: when number of NEDs who are graduate, is equal to or greater than average, then we 
put 1 and 0 otherwise. 
• PG: when number of NEDs who are post graduate, is equal to or greater than average, 
then we put 1 and 0 otherwise. 
• DOCT: when number of NEDs who have the degree of M.phil or PHD, is equal to or 
greater than average, then we put 1 and 0 otherwise. 
• PROF: when number of NEDs who have the professional degrees, is equal to or greater 
than average, then we put 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Analysis and Findings 
The results in Table 1 of descriptive analysis shows that the average ROA is 1percent with 
minimum and maximum value being -0.4 percent and 1.63 percent consecutively. The average 
ROE is 15.47 percent with a minimum and maximum value consecutively -4.59 and 22.69 
percent and the mean value of ROI is 6.91 with minimum of 6.09 and maximum of 7.57 percent. 
The minimum values are exhibiting the status just after the subprime crisis and there after the 
values tend to be positive as well as increasing showing that the sector maintains the assets and 
returns to the shareholder. We may state that except the year succeeding the subprime crisis, the 
banking sector in India has been surviving with an above average growth and operates in risk 
averting conditions. The average Tier I capital is 9.87 percent with a minimum of 6.86 and 
maximum of 16.67 percent and the average of CRAR is 13.83 percent with minimum and 
maximum value consecutively are 11.70 and 18.92 percent. This is perhaps due to the 
requirements of Central bank that the sector maintains a minimum CRAR of 9 percent and Tier I 
capital of 6 percent. Further, it indicates that Indian banks were well capitalised during the post 
crisis period and are conservative in their capital structure policy. The average growth rate of 
Indian bank is 24.45 percent with a minimum of -7.36 and maximum of 80.83 percent. The range 
of growth exhibited by the statistics highlight that some banks in the sample are extremely 
profitable but a few of them still have a questionable bottom line. 
 
Average NPA is 0.89 percent which is not high, with minimum and maximum value 
consecutively is 0.07 and 1.92 percent which implies the banking system in India in respect of 
securitization of their assets is doing well. Although, there have been times especially during the 
1980-90 wherein NPA was a pan India problem. The data reveals such scenario has been a past 
and problem of NPA has been insignificant during the sample period. The stringent regulations 
of central banks may be credited for this advancement. The average board size in our sample is 
10.68 with the maximum of 14.25 which indicates that the Indian banks follow the guidelines of 
RBI that all the banks should have minimum of 10 board members.  The clause 49 of the listing 
agreement in India requires that every board shall meet at least four times a year with a gap of 
not more than four months between two meetings and the sample of the study shows that average 
attendance rate at board meetings is 8.18 with the maximum of 12.01 and minimum value of 
4.88 which means that banks follow this requirement way above the statutory norms. Average 
percentage of independent directors in board is 68.85 percent with a minimum of 36.36 and 
maximum of 91.22 percent.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROE (%) 40 -4.59 22.69 15.466 5.63985 
ROA (%) 40 -0.4 1.63 1.002 0.41783 
ROI (%) 40 6.09 7.57 6.9101 0.3965 
Tier I (%) 40 6.86 16.67 9.8732 2.23233 
CRAR (%) 40 11.7 18.92 13.8334 1.72068 
Growth (%) 40 -7.36 80.83 24.454 17.02644 
NPA (%) 40 0.07 1.92 0.8905 0.4908 
board size 40 7 14.25 10.675 1.45478 
attendance 40 4.88 12.01 8.182 1.50587 
Shares (%) 40 0 2.4125 0.13712828 0.445400439 
ID (%) 40 36.36 91.22 68.8536 13.59183 
Source: Research Compilation 
 
Table 2: Pearsons’ Correlation Analysis 
 
ROE ROA ROI board size attendance ID shares CRAR growth NPA tier I 
ROE 
1                     
                      
ROA 
.771** 1                   
0                     
ROI 
.368* 0.272 1                 
0.019 0.089                   
board size 
0.264 0.134 0.093 1               
0.099 0.41 0.57                 
attendance 
0.125 0.081 0.012 .721** 1             
0.442 0.62 0.941 0               
ID 
0.15 -0.015 0.042 -0.125 -0.217 1           
0.355 0.928 0.797 0.444 0.18             
shares 
-0.046 0.075 0.204 -0.054 -0.006 -0.195 1         
0.777 0.644 0.207 0.739 0.972 0.229           
CRAR 
-0.004 .502** -0.117 -0.05 -0.056 -0.097 -0.033 1       
0.978 0.001 0.472 0.757 0.733 0.552 0.842         
growth 
-0.063 0.112 -0.096 -.391* -0.288 -0.214 0.194 0.204 1     
0.701 0.492 0.557 0.013 0.072 0.186 0.231 0.207       
NPA 
-.500** -.650** -0.03 0.187 -0.045 0.033 0.111 -.334* -0.295 1   
0.001 0 0.853 0.248 0.781 0.84 0.495 0.035 0.064     
tier I 
-0.111 .427** -0.186 -0.177 -0.063 -0.014 0.231 .783** 0.223 -.323* 1 
0.494 0.006 0.252 0.275 0.699 0.931 0.151 0 0.167 0.042   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Correlation Analysis 
The degree of association among the variables of the study is explored in Table 2 with Pearson 
correlation. The results indicate that ROA has a positive correlation with Tier I capital and 
CRAR (both significant at 99% confidence level) implying that for banks, capital adequacy plays 
a key role in the determination of profitability. Capitalization and profitability are considered as 
indicators of banks’ risk management efficiency and provides cushion against losses not covered 
by current earnings (Olalekan & Adeyinka, 2013). Further, the correlation analysis reveals that 
board size has negative correlation with growth rate which is significant at 95% confidence level 
which points out that larger board are generally less effective than smaller boards because of 
communication and co-ordination problems (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). It’s 
worthy to note that NPA have a negative correlation with Tier I capital and CRAR (both 
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significant at 95% confidence level), probably when bank do not lend it leads to higher CRAR 
which results to lower NPA and vice-versa. The bivariate analysis is intriguing because the 
results provide a basis for interpreting the results of regression.  
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
In order to examine the hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 that whether there is any impact of corporate 
governance factors on banks’ performance. The results of regression have been summarized in 
table 3 for each year of study. In year 2008-09 ID and CRAR have a significant positive effect 
on bank performance measured by ROE. CRAR and share have a significant positive effect and 
CEO duality has a negative effect on bank performance measured by ROA.  The R2 is 17.52%, 
26.05% and 18.14% indicates the variation caused by CG variables on ROE, ROA and ROI 
respectively, though it’s typically less as in the case of cross sectional panel data. In year 2009-
10 we found significant positive influence of CRAR and share on ROA and ROI respectively. 
Similarly CEO duality has a negative impact on bank performance measured by ROI and ROE. 
Furthermore in year 2010-11 we found significant positive relation between CRAR and ROA 
and between board size and ROE. ROI is negatively influenced by attendance and positively 
influenced by shares. It has been observed that CRAR has a significant positive impact on bank 
performance measured as ROE and ROA in the year 2011-12. The implications of the findings 
based on multiple regression analysis indicates that ID has a positive effect on bank performance 
(ROE), so we may state that the null hypothesis H4 may be rejected which states that bank 
performance does not affected by number of independent directors on board. Thus this study 
corroborates the argumentation that more number of independent directors in board increase the 
performance of bank (Cornett, McNutt, & Tehraian, 2009). But it does not show any significant 
relationship with ROA and ROI. The CRAR has a positive effect on profitability as measured by 
ROA and ROE, so the null hypothesis H1 may be rejected that the capital adequacy ratio has no 
influence on bank performance. The results are consistent with previous research conducted by 
Unite and Sullivan (2003); Naceur and Kandil (2009); Beltratti and Stulz (2009); Utama and 
Musa (2011). Thus, the existence of the bank’s capital is an important instrument to preserve the 
liquidity of the bank (Siamat 2004). This finding supports the central bank’s effort to strengthen 
bank’s capital base by increasing the minimum capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 9% (In 
accordance with Basel III norms, Indian banks will have to maintain their capital adequacy ratio 
at nine percent as against the minimum recommended requirement of eight per cent). However 
we fail to find the positive effect of CRAR on ROI. Further it is found that shareholding of 
NEDs has a positive effect on bank performance measured by ROA and ROI as the large 
shareholders come with different sets of skills and preferences when the invest in the companies. 
And with the power these shareholders wield, their skills and preferences can have significant 
effects on bank profitability. Therefore null hypothesis H5 may be rejected that number of shares 
held by NEDs has no impact on bank performance. These results are also supported by Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) and Ehikioya (2009). Meanwhile, CEO duality has a negative influence on 
bank performance measure by ROE, ROA and ROI, suggesting the need to separate the position 
of CEO and chairperson to insure the independence of board for optimum bank performance. 
Therefore, this result is consistent with the view that when one person holds the seat of CEO and 
chairman, there would be a more serious agency problem and reduction in the boards’ 
effectiveness of monitoring top management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus we conclude that null 
hypothesis H7 may be rejected that bank performance does not affected by CEO duality. Board 
size has a positive effect on ROE, so we may reject the null hypothesis H2 which states that 
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board size has no impact on bank performance. The result is consistent with the proposition that 
firms with larger boards are more efficient in their asset utilization and they are more likely to 
discipline their CEO for poor performance than smaller boards. This result is also supported by 
Adams and Mehran (2003) who find that the banking sector has a larger board size compared to 
the manufacturing sector and finally led to increased bank performance. Attendance has negative 
effect on ROI. 
 
It may be because of higher attendance in board meetings leads to high expense in the payment 
of sitting fee which is given out of the profits of the corporate. Therefore, we may reject the null 
hypothesis H3 which states that attendance rate of directors at board meeting has no influence on  
bank performance which is also supported by Spong and Sullivan (2012) who said that average 
attendance rate is not statistically related to bank risk. Board size and attendance are statistically 
significant only in the year 2010-11. However the OLS method has not indicated high level of R2 
which means that bank profitability is also affected by other factors too. it is always high and 
increasing when bank profitability is measure by ROA except year 2009-10 and it becomes 
44.01% in 2011-12. Thus on the basis of the results below we conclude that CG practice has the 
positive influence on the bank performance, so we may state that our objective  that corporate 
governance affects banks’ performance hold truth. Therefore this result corroborates the previous 
studies (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006). The finding 
of the study are in congruence with the results of Utama and Musa (2011) and Wang et al. (2012) 
who showed that CG practice have the positive influence on bank performance in pre-crisis 
period. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) proved that banks with stronger CG mechanism 
were associated with higher profitability during the crisis period. Hence our results are consistent 
with the previous studies’ results of pre-crisis period as well as during the crisis. During the 
study period 2008-09 to 2011-12 there were 1322 NED whose education qualification needs to 
be collected. Due to scarcity of data we got hold of the profile of 968 NEDs i.e., 73.22%. There 
were 33.16% graduate, 32.02% were post graduate, 14.46% had the doctoral degree and 20.35% 
of them were professionals during the study period. Hence, the basis of these results and their 
profiles which were given in the annual reports we may state that Indian banking has well 
educated and experienced non-executive directors.  
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Table 3: Relationship Between Bank Performance And Corporate Governance 
  2008-09 2009-10 
  ROE ROA ROI ROE ROA ROI 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C 5.90 0.669 -1.02 0.257 4.73 0.000 2.22 0.855 -0.96 0.299 7.46 0.000 
BOARD_SIZE -0.66 0.462 -0.04 0.511 0.12 0.110 1.10 0.238 0.10 0.169 -0.03 0.681 
ATTENDANCE 0.76 0.397 0.06 0.339 -0.04 0.563 -0.99 0.260 -0.09 0.187 -0.05 0.494 
SHARES 1.52 0.614 0.34 0.086 0.17 0.497 -1.02 0.695 -0.01 0.951 0.54 0.019 
ID 0.17 0.041 0.01 0.196 0.01 0.240 0.14 0.110 0.00 0.469 0.00 0.652 
CRAR 0.01 0.987 0.11 0.012 0.06 0.302 0.25 0.690 0.10 0.035 -0.01 0.902 
CEO_DUALITY -3.43 0.252 -0.34 0.079 -0.30 0.220 -5.53 0.050 -0.24 0.250 -0.60 0.013 
R-squared 0.175 0.261 0.181 0.223 0.219 0.287 
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.126 0.033 0.082 0.077 0.158 
              2010-11 2011-12 
 ROE ROA ROI ROE ROA ROI 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C 0.80 0.944 -1.26 0.107 7.19 0.000 -13.96 0.292 -1.30 0.122 7.60 0.000 
BOARD_SIZE 1.10 0.055 0.06 0.125 0.03 0.490 0.70 0.369 -0.01 0.836 -0.03 0.658 
ATTENDANCE -0.51 0.365 -0.01 0.730 -0.08 0.096 0.37 0.663 0.04 0.433 0.06 0.414 
SHARES 2.51 0.164 0.19 0.126 0.29 0.056 0.51 0.863 -0.03 0.868 0.25 0.304 
ID 0.07 0.309 0.00 0.792 0.01 0.357 -0.02 0.800 0.00 0.470 0.00 0.700 
CRAR 0.32 0.510 0.12 0.001 -0.03 0.420 1.52 0.033 0.17 0.000 -0.02 0.767 
CEO_DUALITY -3.04 0.109 0.02 0.848 -0.23 0.139 -2.66 0.317 -0.01 0.963 0.04 0.854 
R-squared 0.176 0.377 0.206 0.224 0.440 0.096 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.264 0.062 0.083 0.338 -0.068 
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Table 4: Relationship between Education qualification and Bank performance 
ROE ROA ROI 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 17.69802 0 1.178575 0 6.889504 0 
GR 0.755548 0.7133 0.164205 0.2667 -0.046601 0.7476 
PG -3.355024 0.1168 -0.322562 0.0371 0.018956 0.8981 
DOCT -0.663105 0.7394 -0.123134 0.3887 0.227273 0.1118 
PROF -2.381705 0.2214 -0.189098 0.1746 -0.083131 0.5413 
R2 0.090266 0.156748 0.086517 
Adjusted R2 -0.013704 0.060377 -0.017881 
 
Hereafter in the succeeding section we checked the hypothesis 4, 5 and 6 that whether there is 
any impact of education qualification of NEDs on bank performance. The relationship predicted 
in equations 4, 5 and 6 is shown in the regression results produced in the above table 4 which 
exhibit the relationship between education qualification of NEDs and bank performance 
measured by ROE, ROA and ROI. It is found that in equation 4 GR is positively and PG, DOCT 
and PROF are negatively related with profitability (ROE) but not statistically significant. In 
equation 5 GR and profitability (ROA) is directly (positively) related as the slope coefficient of 
the model is positive (0.164). While the P value is 0.2667 which do not reject the null 
hypothesis, meaning that it is not statistically significant. PG, DOCT and PROF are inversely 
related to the profitability as there signs are negative (-0.322, -0.123 and -0.189 respectively). 
The null hypothesis is not rejected by DOCT and PROF as they are not statistically significant 
except PG which is statistically significant at 5% as the p value is 0.0371. In equation 1.6 where 
ROI is the dependent variable, GR and PROF are negatively related to profitability, but not 
statistically significant. The PG and DOCT are directly related to profitability but are not 
statistically significant. The results indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis H07 which 
states that education qualification of NEDs has no influence on bank performance as none of 
them has positive significant impact on profitability. In brief it may be said from the above 
results that profitability is not affected by education qualification and other factors like finance 
experience, management experience (Hau & Thum, 2009), government background, business 
background, age and gender influence the profitability. Also according to Banking regulation Act 
1949 the composition of Board of Directors comprising members with demonstrable professional 
and other experience in specific sectors like agriculture, rural economy, cooperation, SSI, law, 
etc. 
 
Construction of Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
In order to find out the quality of corporate governance mechanism of Indian banks during the 
post crisis we have constructed the corporate governance index (CGI).  The data from annual 
reports has been used to identify the mechanisms and practices of corporate governance. We 
have used the dummy variables which are not legally enforced by clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreements with the Stock Exchanges. The dummy variables which are included in CGI are as 
the CEO duality and chairman of the non- mandatory committees is NED, then variables are 
binary. Similarly if the complete disclosure of the information regarding education qualification 
of NEDs, percentage of independent directors in the board and percentage of shareholding by 
NEDs, ownership pattern, ED’s and NED’s compensation are there in annual reports then the 
variables take value 1, otherwise 0. The CGI’s values can range from 0 to 12. An important note 
for the study is the fact that if in the index a bank presents a low level of corporate governance 
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quality in a particular year, it does not mean that the bank actually has bad level of CG and if a 
bank ranked highly in the index, it does not mean that the bank has a good quality of CG 
mechanism. What we have tried to find in the study is the level of CG quality perceived by an 
outsider without an insider means, tools or accessibility to information during the study’s time 
period 2008-09 to 2011-12. The sample includes 40 listed banks, so the total no. of observations 
is 160. The frequencies for the CGI have been calculated and then divided these frequencies into 
three groups; the first group of observations is located at values 0 to 4, the second at values 5 to 8 
and third group at values 9 to 12. The group leads to 11.9% of the sample is ranked among the 
first group, while 60% is ranked among the second group and only 28.1% among the third group. 
If we join the second and third group then it covered 88.1% of the sample. 
 
Independent-Samples T-Test 
For testing the hypothesis that there is no difference between the CG practice of public and 
private sector banks of India Independent t-test has been used. The independent t-test compares 
the means between two unrelated groups on the same continuous, dependent variable. For the 
equal-variance t test the assumptions are: the observations should be independent, random 
samples from normal distributions with the same population variance. For this t-test we have 
taken the mean value of all the dummy variables which are shown in table 7.  So these variables 
collectively make the CG structure of a bank, which we want to test. Type of bank is the 
independent variable in this test which means for public banks we write 1 and for private bank 
we write 0 and the corporate governance mechanism is the dependent variable. 
 
H08: μ1-μ2=0 (μ1=μ2) There is no difference in the mean value of corporate governance 
mechanism between public banks and private sector banks. 
 
H09: μ1-μ2≠0 (μ1 ≠μ2) There is a difference in the mean value of corporate governance 
mechanism between public banks and private sector banks. 
 
Testing the hypothesis as a two-tailed test with  = 0.05 the t value of -8.436 falls within the 
critical region defined by the critical value of  2.048 and the p-value is less than alpha of 0.05. 
Therefore we may state that there is no difference in the mean value of corporate governance 
mechanism between public banks and private banks. As private banks have more mean value of 
corporate governance (mean = 9.1094, sd = 1.77475) than public (mean = 5.1562, sd = 1.19513). 
So we may state a significant statistical difference in these averages. Therefore we may say that 
there is no difference between CG practice of listed public and private sector banks of India. 
 
Conclusion 
We observed that the results of regression are not consistent during the study period but 
collectively the results point out that Indian banks’ performance is positively affected by board 
size, number of independent directors, CRAR, and number of shares held by NEDs and it is 
negatively influenced by attendance and CEO duality. Hence we may conclude that the main 
factors of corporate governance of banks in India are board size, percentage of independent 
directors in the board, CRAR, number of shares held by NEDs and non CEO duality.  We may 
say that the study supports the Agency theory of corporate governance as bank performance is 
negatively related with CEO duality. Hence we may also state that CG factors have positive 
impact on Indian banks’ performance during post crisis period, which is supported by the pre-
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crisis period results as well as during the crisis period. The implication of these findings is that 
corporate governance practices enhances the banks’ performance and the findings supports the 
central banks’ efforts to enhance the CG practice in the Indian banking sectors. The study reveals 
that the performance and corporate governance variables of the listed Indian banks have been in 
a relatively comfortable position as read in other developed nations during the post subprime 
crisis period may be due to prudent regulation of the Reserve Bank of India and not so prevalent 
derivative holdings of banks. The study has tested the underlying assumptions of OLS model and 
on the basis of overall results we found that the error term is normally distributed and 
homoscedastic. Further there is no auto correlation in the error term. Panel data is inappropriate 
in this model as the error term do not reflect hetroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore the 
research can be used for further decision making. The study gives a scope of further research by 
extending the model and including more variables like age and gender of board member and role, 
responsibility, eligibility criteria for appointment of independent NEDs.  
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